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Abstract Bluetooth-like applications face the pairing problem: two devices want to estab-
lish a relationship between them without any prior private information. Hoep-
man studied the ephemeral pairing problem by regarding the human operator
of the devices as a messenger in an authenticated and/or private low-bandwidth
channel between the nodes. Here we study the pairing problem with user interac-
tion in which the operator can participate by doing extra (simple) computations.
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1. Introduction
A typical problem in wireless networks is that we do not know if two com-
municating devices are actually talking to each other. The pairing problem
consists of securely establishing a private key between two or more specific
physical nodes in the network. We assume that no secret information is shared
between the nodes before the pairing. Furthermore, we want a high level of
security and a minimal human interaction. Pairing between Bluetooth devices
is a typical setting. In Hoe04, Hoepman studied the ephemeral pairing problem
(denoted ϕKE): given a low bandwidth authentic and/or private communica-
tion channel between two nodes (called Alice and Bob), and a high bandwidth
broadcast channel, can we establish a high-entropy shared secret session key
without relying on any a priori shared secret information? The low bandwidth
channel can be a (passive) human user who can read a PIN code on one de-
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vice and write it on the other in a secure way. However there are many cases
where this model is not sufficient: first, the standard Bluetooth pairing in which
the user generates the PIN code; second, cases where the devices have no in-
put keyboard or no output screen; third, when confidentiality (for instance) is
guaranteed from the user to one device but not the other; etc. In this paper,
we extend the model by introducing the user as a real participant who can fur-
ther do simple computations. We call it the user-aided key exchange (UAKE)
problem.
Gehrmann and Nyberg gave in GN01 two schemes. They also created a new
scheme in GN04 using a MAC function and Jakobsson provided a variant of
this scheme in Jak01. Those schemes are adapted to cases where one device
has no input keyboard or no output screen.
The pairing problem is highly related to the authenticated key exchange
problem (AKE): two users want to establish an authenticated high-entropy pri-
vate key from scratch. Bellovin and Merritt BM92 gave a class of protocols
called EKE (Encrypted Key Exchange) that solves the AKE problem using the
assumption that the two peers already share a low-entropy password. EKE is
basically an encrypted Diffie-Hellman DH76 key exchange. Jaspan Jas96 ana-
lyzed the Diffie-Hellman parameters in order to avoid partition attacks against
EKE (in the case where the password is not ephemeral). Then Boyko et al.
BMP00 specified a slightly different version of Diffie-Hellman based EKE
called PAK (Password Authenticated Key exchange). MacKenzie Mac02 pro-
vided proofs in the Bellare-Rogaway model BR94. (A survey on authenticated
key establishment protocols is available in BM03.) Note that in this paper,
“EKE protocol” denotes independently the EKE or PAK protocol.
2. The pairing problem models
2.1 The pairing problems
In the pairing problem, two nodes in a (wireless ad-hoc) network, that do not
yet share any secret, want to establish a secure association. They may be able
to exchange small amounts of information reliably and/or in a private way by
being attended by a human operator. The ephemeral key exchange (ϕKE) prob-
lem considers the human operator as a simple messenger between the nodes. In
this paper we consider the user-aided key exchange (UAKE) problem in which
the operator really participates. The nodes can communicate through the inse-
cure channel and the user can securely exchange small amounts of information
with the nodes and perform simple operations. Protocols must be such that:
1 both nodes and the user are ensured that the secret is shared with the
correct physical node
2 no other node learns any part of the shared secret
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3 a user needs to perform only simple and intuitive steps
For the third requirement, we allow the following operations: pick a random
string, compare two strings, copy a string, XOR two strings. Avoiding the
(quite complicated) XOR will be addressed in Section 4.1. We further limit
user channels to a small bandwidth. The second requirement will be made
clear by formalizing the security model. Once achieved, the first requirement is
satisfied by standard key confirmation techniques. Note that we do not consider
denial of services attacks.
By directly introducing the user in the problem, we can consider many dif-
ferent situations that can be encountered in practice. For example, we can eas-
ily describe the Bluetooth pairing in many different scenarios such as devices
with no output screen or no input keyboard, pairing in a hostile environment
when anyone can look over the user’s shoulder, etc.
2.2 The communication model
Two nodes Alice and Bob are connected through a high bandwidth channel
network. The adversary Eve has full control over this channel. Both nodes
however share with the user two communication channels (one in each direc-
tion) which can have specific security properties:
1 confidentiality: the sender is guaranteed that the messages she sends
can not be read by anyone but the right receiver (Eve can not read it).
2 integrity: the receiver is guaranteed that the message he receives was
actually sent as is (Eve can not modify it).
3 authentication: the receiver is guaranteed that the message he receives
was actually sent by the right sender (Eve can not modify or insert a
message in the channel but can delay or replay a message). (Note that
our definition of authentication implicitly assumes integrity.)
These properties may hold in both directions, or only in one direction. In this
paper, we will not consider the integrity property except in our final discussion
in Section 4.1 to simplify the protocols. Note that lack of integrity protection in
confidential channels means that it could be possible for Eve to replace a con-
fidential z message by a message z⊕δ with a δ of her choice. (This is typically
the case when the confidential channel is implemented by a stream cipher, e.g.
in Bluetooth.) We further assume independence between the channels in the
sense that it is impossible for an adversary e.g. to take a message from a secure
channel and to insert it into another.
We thus have 4 unidirectional channels that can have one of four attributes:
AC (authenticated and confidential channel), A (authenticated channel), C (con-
fidential channel) and 0 (no security property). Those channels represent all
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the interactions with the user. For example, a screen on a device represents a
channel of type A from the device to the user who is watching the screen, a de-
vice holder typing a code on the device’s keyboard in a private way represents
a channel of type AC from the user to the device. Moreover, we can consider
channels with an extremely low bandwidth (typically one bit) if we use a single
light, or a single Boolean button for low cost devices.
2.3 The security model
We use the adversary model of Bellare et al. BPR00. Each participant p may
engage in the protocol many times in a concurrent way. For each new protocol
run where p is asked to play a role, a unique instance piip is created. Eve has the
entire control of the network and about who is running a new step of a protocol
run. In a UAKE protocol with participants p, q, and r playing the role of Alice,
Bob, and User respectively, we create new instances piip, pi
j
q, and pikr with input
(p,q,r). piip and pi
j
q should terminate with a key. (The ϕKE protocol is similar:
r is simply hidden.) The attack is formalized by giving access to oracles for
the instances of the network to the adversary:
Execute(piip,pi
j
q,pikr): execute a complete protocol run with piip, pi
j
q, and
pikr . This query models passive attacks.
Corrupt(p,x): get all internal information about p and force its secret
data (if any) to become x.
Reveal(piip): reveal the key generated by piip to the adversary.
Send(piip,m): send a message m to the instance piip and run a new step of
the protocol.
Test(piip): this query can be called only once. A bit b is flipped at random
a random key (if b = 0) or the key from piip (if b = 1) is output.
Eve makes a Test query and tries to correctly guess the bit b. The attack is
successful if p,q,r are not corrupted and if Test(piip) or Test(pi
j
q) led to the
right guess for b. Thus we define the advantage of Eve attacking the protocol
by AdvE = 2Pr[correct]− 1. Note that we can not send a Test(piip) query if a
Reveal(piip) or Reveal(pi
j
q) query has already been sent, otherwise finding the
value of the bit b would be trivial. We do not consider long term passwords as
in regular EKE schemes but rather ephemeral ones. So oracles Reveal(piip) and
Corrupt(p,x) are not relevant in our context.
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3. Key exchange with user interaction
3.1 The ephemeral pairing problem
In the original ϕKE problem, we have 24 = 16 different possible configura-
tions (2 channels and 4 possible security properties for each channel). We can
represent each of those configurations by a 2× 2 Boolean matrix: each row
corresponds to a security property (A and C), and each column corresponds
to a channel. For more readability, we represent the matrix by M = [A
a−⇀↽
b
B]
where a,b ∈ {0,A,C,AC} are the columns of M. We denote ϕKE(M) the ϕKE
problem with the configuration represented by the matrix M. If a secure pro-
tocol can be found for the ϕKE(M) problem, we say that ϕKE(M) is possible.
Otherwise, we say that it is impossible. First of all, we can see that the ϕKE
problem is symmetric: ϕKE(M) is equivalent to ϕKE(sym(M))where sym(M)
is the M matrix with the columns inverted. Furthermore, if a ϕKE(M1) prob-
lem represented by the configuration matrix M1 is possible, we can solve the
problem with additional security properties by using the same protocol. We
denote M1 ≤M2 for corresponding configuration matrices M2.
Fact 1 Let M1 and M2 be two ϕKE problem configuration matrices. If M1 ≤
M2, any protocol which solves ϕKE(M1) solves ϕKE(M2) as well.
Fact 2 Let M be a ϕKE problem configuration matrix. ϕKE(M) is possible
if and only if ϕKE(sym(M)) is possible.
Theorem 3 (Hoe05) ϕKE(A C−⇀↽
A
B) is impossible.
Hoepman provided protocols for all minimal possible configurations. We can
see that two types of protocols are used: we can try to make Alice and Bob
share a low-entropy password and compute the EKE protocol with that pass-
word (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). The two devices can also try to run a Diffie-
Hellman key exchange with commitment and authenticate with the low band-
width channel (see Figure 3).
Theorem 4 (Hoe04) ϕKE(A AC−→ B) and ϕKE(A C−⇀↽
C
B) are possible by us-
ing the protocol from Figures 1 and 2 respectively. The advantage of an adver-
sary which is limited to q oracles queries is at most the best advantage of an
adversary to the EKE protocol with the same parameter q.
Theorem 5 (Hoe04) We consider a group G of order at least 22s in which
the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard. We consider five hash functions
h1 : G → G, h2 : G → {0,1}t , h3,h4,h5 : G → {0,1}σ such that h1(X) and
h2(X) are independent for X ∈U G, h2 is balanced, and h3, h4, and h5 are
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(independent) pairwise independent random hash functions. ϕKE(A A−⇀↽
A
B) is
possible by using the protocol from Figure 3. The advantage of an adversary
which is limited to q oracle queries is O(1− e−q.2−t )+O(2−s).
Alice Bob
send p on AC
pick p ∈ {0,1}t
run EKE(p) run EKE(p)
Figure 1. ϕKE(A AC−→ B)
Alice Bob
p = p1⊕ p2
run EKE(p)
p = p1⊕ p2
run EKE(p)
send p1 on C
send p2 on C
pick p1 ∈ {0,1}t pick p2 ∈ {0,1}t
Figure 2. ϕKE(A
C−⇀↽−
C
B)
3.2 The user-aided key exchange problem
In the UAKE problem we have 44 = 256 different possible configurations (4
channels and 4 different states for each channel). We can represent each of
those configurations by a 2× 4 matrix as in the ϕKE problem. For more
readability, we represent the matrix by M = [A
a−⇀↽
b
U
d−⇀↽
c
B] where a,b,c,d ∈
{0,A,C,AC} correspond to the columns. We denote UAKE(M) the UAKE
problem with the configuration represented by the matrix M. The UAKE prob-
lem is symmetric: UAKE(M) is the same problem as UAKE(sym(M)) where
sym(M) is the M matrix with some columns inverted so that the role of Alice
and Bob is exchanged.
Fact 6 Let M1 and M2 be two UAKE problem configuration matrices. If
M1 ≤M2, any protocol solving UAKE(M1) solves UAKE(M2) as well.
Fact 7 Let M be a UAKE problem configuration matrix. UAKE(M) is possi-
ble if and only if UAKE(sym(M)) is possible.
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Authentication
Key exchange
Key validation
Alice Bob
Commitment
pick x ∈ {0,1, · · · ,#G−1}
send gy on BC
send gx on BC
receive αB from BC
receive αA from BC
receive βB from A
receive βA from A
receive mA from BC
receive mB from BC
then abort
receive nA from BC
receive nB from BC
then abort
If h4(mBy) 6= nB
k = h3(mBy)
If h5(mAx) 6= nA
k = h3(mAx)
If h1(mA) 6= αA
or h2(mA) 6= βA
If h1(mB) 6= αB
or h2(mB) 6= βB
then abort then abort
send h1(gx) on BC
send h1(gy) on BC
send h2(gx) on A
send h2(gy) on A
send h4(mAx) on BC
send h5(mBy) on BC
pick y ∈ {0,1, · · · ,#G−1}
Figure 3. ϕKE(A
A−⇀↽−
A
B)
We consider two participants Alice and Bob of UAKE(A
a−⇀↽
b
U
d−⇀↽
c
B) protocol.
By simulating the interaction between Alice and User by a participant C. We
obtain a protocol for ϕKE(C d−⇀↽
c
B). We deduce:
Fact 8 Let a,b,c,d ∈ {0,A,C,AC}. If UAKE(A a−⇀↽
b
U
d−⇀↽
c
B) is possible then
ϕKE(A a−⇀↽
b
B) and ϕKE(A d−⇀↽
c
B) are also possible.
Considering a messenger U who forwards messages, we obtain:
Fact 9 Let a,b ∈ {0,A,C,AC}. If ϕKE(A a−⇀↽
b
B) is possible then UAKE(A
a−⇀↽
b
U
a−⇀↽
b
B) is also possible.
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Theorem 10 Let a,b,c,d ∈ {0,A,C,AC}. UAKE(A a−⇀↽
b
U
d−⇀↽
c
B) is possible if
and only if ϕKE(A a−⇀↽
b
B) and ϕKE(A d−⇀↽
c
B) are possible. Channels with security
property 0 can be removed, except for (A AC−→U AC←− B) which is impossible.
Proof: Let us prove that UAKE(A AC−→ U AC←− B) is impossible. In that con-
figuration, Alice and Bob can not receive anything from any secure channel.
By removing any interaction with U , we obtain a ϕKE(A 0−⇀↽
0
B) protocol which
contradicts Theorem 3 and Fact 1. Other impossible cases follow from Fact 8.
Let us now show that UAKE(A
a−⇀↽
b
U
d−⇀↽
c
B) is possible for all combinations of
ϕKE limit cases: ϕKE(A A−⇀↽
A
B), ϕKE(A C−⇀↽
C
B), ϕKE(A AC−→ B) and ϕKE(A AC←−
B). By using symmetries, we restrict to the following limit cases:
Type 1: (A AC−→U AC−→ B), (A C−⇀↽
C
U
C−⇀↽
C
B), (A
A−⇀↽
A
U
A−⇀↽
A
B).
Type 2: (A AC←−U AC−→ B), (A C−⇀↽
C
U AC−→ B), (A C−⇀↽
C
U AC←− B).
Type 3: (A
A−⇀↽
A
U
C−⇀↽
C
B), (A
A−⇀↽
A
U AC−→B), (A A−⇀↽
A
U AC←−B), (A AC−⇀↽−
0
U AC←−B).
Fact 9 addresses limit cases of type 1. Theorem 11 and 12 below provide a
solution for limit cases of type 2 and 3 respectively. ¤
User BobAlice
pp
EKE(p) EKE(p)
pick p ∈ {0,1}t
Figure 4. UAKE(A AC←−U AC−→ B)
Theorem 11 UAKE(A AC←−U AC−→B), UAKE(A C−⇀↽
C
U AC−→B) and UAKE(A C−⇀↽
C
U AC←− B) are possible by using the protocols from Figures 4, 5 and 6 respec-
tively. The advantage of an adversary which is limited to q oracles queries is
at most the best advantage of an adversary to the EKE protocol with the same
parameter q plus 2−t .
Proof: The Figure 4 case is trivial: we assume we can set up a password in a
secure way prior to EKE. For the cases of Figures 5 and 6, we note that if the
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User BobAlice
z p
p⊕ z
EKE(p)EKE(p)
compute p⊕ zcompute p
pick z ∈ {0,1}t pick p ∈ {0,1}t
Figure 5. UAKE(A
C−⇀↽−
C
U AC−→ B)
User BobAlice
z p
p⊕ z
EKE(p)EKE(p)
compute p⊕ zcompute p
pick p ∈ {0,1}tpick z ∈ {0,1}t
Figure 6. UAKE(A
C−⇀↽−
C
U AC←− B)
Authentication
User BobAlice
zh2(gx)
“OK”
pick z ∈ {0,1}t
z,h2(gx) receive zB,βB and if
z 6= zB then abort
receive z′
z
compute z′⊕h2(gy)
compute βA = hA⊕ z
receive hA
z
z′⊕h2(gy)
pick z ∈ {0,1}t
Figure 7. Authentication step in Figure 3 for UAKE(A
A−⇀↽−
A
U
IC−⇀↽−
C
B)
adversary impersonates User to Alice, since she has no clue about (Bob’s) p,
Alice will receive an incorrect p with probability 1−2−t and EKE will fail. ¤
Theorem 12 With the same hypotheses as in Theorem 5, UAKE(A
A−⇀↽
A
U
IC−⇀↽−
C
B), UAKE(A
A−⇀↽
A
U AC−→ B), UAKE(A A−⇀↽
A
U AC←− B), and UAKE(A AC−⇀↽−
0
U AC←− B)
are possible by using the sub-protocols from Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10 respectively
in the protocol of Figure 3. The advantage of an adversary which is limited to
q oracle queries is O(q.2−t)+O(2−s). The first part of the protocol on Figure
7 further assumes integrity in the U → B channel.
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Authentication
User BobAlice
h2(gy)
z
receive βA βA βA
zA
z
then abort
receive zA
if z 6= zA
“OK”
pick z ∈ {0,1}t
if h2(gy) 6= βA
then abort
Figure 8. Authenticated channel from Bob to Alice in A
A−⇀↽−
A
U AC−→ B
Authentication
User BobAlice
h2(gx)
z z
z
pick z ∈ {0,1}t
h2(gx)
receive βB
βBif h2(gx) 6= βB
then abort
receive zB and if
z 6= zB then abort
Figure 9. Authenticated channel from Alice to Bob in A
A−⇀↽−
A
U AC←− B
A heavier protocol for UAKE(A
A−⇀↽
A
U
C−⇀↽
C
B) without the integrity assumption
is provided in Section 4.5.
Proof (sketch): In Figure 8 (resp. Figure 9), if the adversary impersonates
Bob to Alice (resp. Alice to Bob), the random z will never be released, so the
protocol cannot succeed but with a probability of 2−t . Figure 10 is similar.
In Figure 7 second part, the adversary has no clue about h2(gy) and z until
User discloses z. So, if she impersonates Bob to Alice, she can not predict
which h2(gy) Alice will obtain. Consistency check with the commitment phase
in Hoepman’s protocol will thus reject with a probability of 1−2−t (Note that
this works because h2(gy) is unknown prior to the protocol).¤
4. Discussions
4.1 Removing the XORs
We can see that the user has to compute the XOR of two values in protocols
from Figures 5 and 6. Those cases have a common particularity: we have a
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Authentication
User BobAlice
h2(gx)
z′B
if h2(gx) 6= βB
then abort
receive z′′B and if
zB 6= z′′B then abort
βB,zB pick zB ∈ {0,1}t
h2(gy)
receive βA
pick zA ∈ {0,1}t βA,zA if h2(gy) 6= βA
then abortzA
receive z′A and if
zA 6= z′A then abort
h2(gx)
receive βB
zB
receive z′B
h2(gy)
Figure 10. Authentication step in Figure 3 for UAKE(A
AC−⇀↽−
0
U AC←− B)
confidential non-authenticated channel between the user and Alice or Bob. In
pairing situations those cases may not be relevant: such a channel would e.g.
mean for example that the user types some digits on one device in a private
way but the device is not sure that the typed digits actually come from the user!
Nevertheless, those XORs can be removed by assuming integrity in addition
to confidentiality. (Virtual confidential channels achieving this can typically
be implemented by using encryption with strong security properties, e.g. IND-
CCA2. Using less secure encryption, e.g. CBC encryption requires extra care.)
In that case we replace the XORs by the concatenation.
4.2 User operations and bandwidth
One of the crucial points of our protocols are the ease of use for the user, we
can thus analyze the number of operations computed by the user on the devices.
In Figure 11 is shown the user operations according to the different protocols.
According to the previous section, we can remove the XORs; in our table that
would mean adding two copied values for each XOR.
4.3 Applications
A typical application of the UAKE problem would be the Bluetooth authenti-
cation scheme. The standard Bluetooth pairing assumes the same configuration
as the protocol shown on Figure 4: the user types a password on both devices
in a private and authenticate way. But according to our analysis of the UAKE
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UAKE problems pick compare copy XOR receive send
A AC−→U AC−→ B t t t
A
C−⇀↽−
C
U
C−⇀↽−
C
B 2t 2t 2t
A
A−⇀↽−
A
U
A−⇀↽−
A
B 2t 2t 2t
A AC←−U AC−→ B t t 2t
A
C−⇀↽−
C
U AC−→ B t t t 2t
A
C−⇀↽−
C
U AC←− B t 2t t
A
A−⇀↽−
A
U
IC−⇀↽−
C
B t 3t 2t + 1 4t
A
A−⇀↽−
A
U AC−→ B t t t 3t 3t + 1
A
A−⇀↽−
A
U AC←− B t t 4t 2t
A
AC−⇀↽−
0
U AC←− B 2t 2t 6t 2t
Figure 11. User operations in UAKE protocols (in bits)
problem, we can consider many other cases. For example, the user can read
a password on device Alice and copy it on the device Bob. Moreover, we can
imagine as explained on Figure 9, that the device Bob has only a private and
authenticate screen but no keyboard and that the user can read and type data on
device Alice in an authenticated way but not in a private way.
Another application could be the establishment of a secure SSL or SSH
session without certificates. In the A
A−⇀↽
A
U
A−⇀↽
A
B case, the user could indeed be
two human operators talking (in an authenticated way) over the telephone, i.e.
a A
A−⇀↽
A
UA
A−⇀↽
A
UB
A−⇀↽
A
B scenario.
Note that problems arise if we do not consider mutual belief in the key as
shown by Lowe in Low96. The UAKE protocols should similarly be followed
by an acknowledgment protocol.
4.4 Manufacturer aided key exchange
We can consider that a password pM has been written in the non-volatile mem-
ory of one device by the manufacturer, for example for a low-cost device with-
out any keyboard. That would mean a fourth node M in our pairing scheme
representing the manufacturer. AC channels from M to Bob and to User can be
considered. Note that those channels can only be used once in the first setup.
That new assumption would change protocols shown on Figures 4, 5 and 6: we
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use now pM for the EKE protocol. This works in a A
C←−U AC←− M AC−→ B set-
ting. Note that obviously this scheme leads to weaker versions of our protocols
since the password used for each instance remains always the same.
We can also easily adapt the ϕKE(A A−⇀↽
A
B) protocol in Figure 3 to solve the
pairing problem in a A
A−⇀↽
A
U A−→ B or A A−⇀↽
A
U A←− B configuration with a prior
U AC←−M AC−→ B setup. We can even restrict one of the two A A−⇀↽
A
U channels to
a single bit.
4.5 UAKE(A
A−⇀↽−
A
U
C−⇀↽−
C
B)
We now consider the protocol on Figure 12 as a replacement for the authenti-
cation phase in the protocol of Figure 3 using GF(2t) arithmetics.
In the first part of the protocol, we consider an optimal adversary who tries to
make Bob accept a β of his choice for X = h2(gx). (This follows a commitment
phase in Hoepman’s protocol, so an attack which makes Bob accept a random
value is thwarted by the consistency check when opening the commitment.)
Note that the right value of X is unknown to the adversary prior to the protocol.
Without loss of generality, the adversary replaces (u,v) by (u′,v′) = f (u,v), the
returned (u′,v′) by (u′′,v′′) = g(u′,v′), X by β, and w= u′+v′β by w′ = hX(w)
for some chosen functions f , g, and hX .
Let Sw be the set of all (u,v) such that g(u′,v′) = (u,v) for (u′,v′) = f (u,v),
and u′+ v′β = w. Note that #Sw ≤ 2t . The attack is successful if and only if
(X ,u,v) is such that there exists w such that u+ vX = hX(w) and (u,v) ∈ Sw.
Hence the probability of success p is
p =
1
22t(2t −1)∑w ∑X #{(u,v) ∈ Sw;u+ vX = hX(w)}.
Given w, let now ni be the number of X’s such that {(u,v) ∈ Sw;u+ vX =
hX(w)} has cardinality i. We can view the (u,v) pairs as straight lines. Given a
set of i straight lines such that u+ vX = hX(w) for one fixed X and w, we have
i(i− 1)/2 pairs of straight lines intersecting on the same point. If we sum all
pairs over all X’s, we obtain an overall number of intersecting pairs of at most
#Sw× (#Sw−1)/2. Hence
∑
i
ni× i(i−1)2 ≤
#Sw× (#Sw−1)
2
≤ 2
t(2t −1)
2
.
We have
∑
X
#{(u,v) ∈ Sw;u+ vX = hX(w)}=
2t
∑
i=1
i.ni
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with the constraint ∑i ni ≤ 2t . By linear programming results we obtain that
∑
X
#{(u,v) ∈ Sw;u+ vX = hX(w)} ≤ O
(
23t/2
)
hence p ≤ O(2−t/2). This big O is thus a new term to add in Theorem 12 for
our protocol without the integrity assumption.
Authentication
User BobAlice
“OK”
z
compute βA
z′⊕h2(gy)
pick z ∈ {0,1}t receive z′z
compute z′⊕h2(gy)
start
go
with v 6= 0
h2(gx)
receive βB
ok
w
u,v
then abort
then abort
pick u,v ∈ GF(2t )
receive u′ ,v′
u′ ,v′
compute w = u′+ v′βBreceive w′u,v,w
′receive w′ and if
w′ 6= u+ vh2(gx)
receive u′′ ,v′′ and
if u 6= u′′ or v 6= v′′
Figure 12. Authenticated step in Figure 3 for UAKE(A
A−⇀↽−
A
U
C−⇀↽−
C
B)
5. Conclusion
We have extended Hoepman’s ephemeral pairing problem by introducing the
User Aided Key Exchange problem. We studied the minimal assumptions and
provided pairing protocols in all cases.
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